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Construction Law
by Frank 0. Brown, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article focuses on noteworthy construction law decisions by
appellate and federal district courts in Georgia between June 1, 2009
and May 31, 2010.1
II.

NEGLIGENT CONSTRUCTION

In Cendant Mobility FinancialCorp. v. Asuamah,2 Cendant Mobility

Financial Corp. (Cendant) managed employee relocation benefits,
including the sales of homes of relocated employees. Ms. Asuamah
purchased a townhome from Cendant. After discovering water-related
problems, she sued Cendant and others, asserting various claims.'
Among these claims was that prior to her purchase, "Cendant negligently repaired the townhome by accepting the [negligent] work done by an
independent contractor." The trial court granted summary judgment
to Cendant on all claims.' The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the negligent repair claim against Cendant.'
The Georgia Supreme Court then granted Cendant's petition for writ
of certiorari.! In its opinion, the supreme court stated that it had

* Shareholder in the firm ofWeissman, Nowack, Curry &Wilco, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia.
General Counsel: Greater Atlanta Home Builders Association, Inc., The Housing Institute,
Inc., and HomeAid Atlanta, Inc. Rhodes College (B.A., 1976); Emory University School of
Law (J.D., 1979). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia construction law during the prior survey period, see
Frank 0. Brown Jr., ConstructionLaw, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 61 MERCER L. REV.
65 (2009).
2. 285 Ga. 818, 684 S.E.2d 617 (2009).
3. Id. at 819, 684 S.E.2d at 618.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 819, 684 S.E.2d at 618-19.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 818-19, 684 S.E.2d at 618-19.
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granted the petition because it was "particularly concerned with the
Court of Appeals's extension of the Worthey [v. Holmes] exception to
caveat emptor to hold a non-builder/seller liable in negligence for latent
construction/repair defects."' In reversing the court of appeals on the
negligent construction claim, the supreme court stated in unusually
clear, strong, and broad language, that
[t]o dispel any doubt, we hold that the "negligent construction"
exception to caveat emptor exempts from the defense of caveat emptor
only a negligence claim by a homeowner seeking recovery against the
builder/seller of the home for latent building construction defects about
which the purchaser/homeowner did not know and in the exercise of
ordinary care would not have discovered, which defects either were
known to the builder/seller or in the exercise of ordinary care would
have been discovered by the builder/seller. Inasmuch as Cendant is
not a builder/seller of the dwelling purchased by Asuamah, the trial
court did not err when it granted summary judgment to Cendant.9
Given the breadth of this language, negligent construction claims
against other non-builder/sellers, such as developers of condominiums
constructed by independent contractors, appear to be barred.
III.

GEORGIA'S CONSTRUCTION-REIATED STATUTE OF REPOSE

A. Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc.
In Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc.,'o a deck on a home collapsed
eleven years after a certificate of occupancy for the home was issued and
the home was sold to its first buyers. A year later, the third buyer of the
home sued the original builder of the home and deck for personal
injuries resulting from the collapse. The plaintiff alleged that the deck
had been negligently constructed.u Pursuant to section 9-3-51 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)," the builder asserted
that the claims were barred by the eight- to ten-year construction-related
statute of repose."3 In response, the plaintiff argued that the builder

8. Id. at 819, 684 S.E.2d at 619 (citing Worthey v. Holmes, 249 Ga. 104, 287 S.E.2d

9 (1982)).
9. Id. at 822, 684 S.E.2d at 620-21 (citation omitted).
10. 302 Ga. App. 78, 690 S.E.2d 183 (2009).
11. Id. at 78-79, 690 S.E.2d at 184.

12. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51 (2007).
13. Rosenberg, 302 Ga. App. at 79 & n.2, 690 S.E.2d at 184 & n.2. Pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51,
(a) No action to recover damages:
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was equitably estopped from asserting the statute of repose because the
builder had fraudulently concealed the negligent construction by using
bolts that made the deck appear to be properly attached to the house."
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to the builder based on the statute of repose." In
explaining its decision, the court first stated that a statute of repose,
unlike a statute of limitation, cannot be "tolled" by fraud."e The court
noted, however, that a defendant may be equitably estopped from
asserting the statute of repose if (a) "the plaintiffs injury occurred before
the statute of repose period expired," (b) "the defendant's fraud occurred
after the injury," and (c) the "fraud delayed or prevented the plaintiff
from filing suit until after the statute of repose period had expired.""
Because the plaintiff's injuries occurred after the statute of repose had
expired, the court reasoned that equitable estoppel did not apply.'"

(1) For any deficiency in the survey or plat, planning, design, specifications,
supervision or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to
real property;
(2) For injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such deficiency; or
(3) For injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such
deficiency
shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the survey or plat,
design, planning, supervision or observation of construction, or construction of
such an improvement more than eight years after substantial completion of such
an improvement.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this Code section, in the case of such an
injury to property or the person or such an injury causing wrongful death, which
injury occurred during the seventh or eighth year after such substantial
completion, an action in tort to recover damages for such an injury or wrongful
death may be brought within two years after the date on which such injury
occurred, irrespective of the date of death, but in no event may such an action be
brought more than ten years after the substantial completion of construction of
such an improvement.
14. Rosenberg, 302 Ga. App. at 79-80, 690 S.E.2d at 184-85. The plaintiff did not assert
a cause of action for fraudulent concealment, but he argued that the alleged fraudulent
concealment estopped the builder from relying on the statute of repose. Id at 80 & n.4,
690 S.E.2d at 185 & n.4.
15. Id at 81-82, 690 S.E.2d at 186.
16. Id. at 80, 690 S.E.2d at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 (2007), which applies to statutes of limitation, "[ilf the defendant or those
under whom he claims are guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff has been debarred or
deterred from bringing an action, the period of limitation shall run only from the time of
the plaintiffs discovery of the fraud."
17. Rosenberg, 302 Ga. App. at 81, 690 S.E.2d at 186.
18. See id. at 81-82, 690 S.E.2d at 186.
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B. Facility ConstructionManagement, Inc. v. Ahrens Concrete Floors,
Inc.
In Facility ConstructionManagement, Inc. v. Ahrens Concrete Floors,
Inc.,"9 Facility Construction Management, Inc. (Facility), a general
contractor, contracted to construct a project in Pennsylvania. Facility
retained Ahrens Concrete Floors, Inc. (Ahrens) to construct the project's
concrete floor. The subcontract between the parties required Ahrens to
indemnify Facility against claims arising from Ahrens's work and
further required Ahrens to obtain insurance to cover its work and its
indemnification obligation. Ahrens did obtain insurance, which named
Facility as an additional insured. Ahrens substantially completed the
floor in September 1999. In August 2002, the project's owner sued
Facility for damages in Pennsylvania state court, alleging defective
construction of the floor.o
Facility called upon Regent Insurance Company (Regent), the insurer
from which Ahrens had obtained insurance, to defend the project owner's
claim. Regent denied coverage and filed a declaratory judgment action
against Facility in Iowa.2 ' Facility sued Ahrens in the Superior Court
of Cobb County, Georgia in March 2008, while both the owner's
Pennsylvania suit against Facility and Regent's Iowa declaratory
judgment action were still pending." Facility alleged, inter alia, that
Ahrens had breached its contractual obligation to indemnify and to
obtain insurance and that Ahrens negligently represented that it had
Facility
obtained insurance in compliance with its subcontract.'
sought damages and a declaratory judgment relating to Ahrens's
obligations to defend and indemnify.'
Ahrens filed a motion for summary judgment, which focused on its
defense that all of Facility's claims were barred by Georgia's construction-related statute of repose at O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51.25 Facility argued
that Pennsylvania's twelve-year statute of repose governed rather than
Georgia's eight- to ten-year statute of repose." The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia rejected that

19.
20.
21.
22.
Court
23.
24.
25.
26.

No. 1:08-cv-01600-JOF, 2010 WL 1265184 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2010).
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1, *2. The defendant later removed the action to the United States District
for the Northern District of Georgia based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. at *1.
Id, at *2-3.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2, *4.
Id. at *4.

20101

CONSTRUCTION LAW

75

argument, reasoning that while Pennsylvania law governed the
substantive issues between the parties, Georgia law governed procedural
matters, which include statutes of repose.2 7 The court then noted that
because the flooring project was completed in September 1999 and
because the subject suit was not filed until March 2008, any of Facility's
claims covered by the terms of Georgia's statute of repose would be
barred.'
Facility contended that its claims for indemnification and for breach
of duty to maintain insurance were not covered by the statute of repose
because they were not claims for deficient construction, the type of
claims addressed in the statute.' The court rejected that argument,
stating that although Facility's claims were "couched in terms of
indemnification and defense, [Facility was] required to prove [that
Ahrens] deficiently constructed, planned, or designed the concrete slab"
In essence, the court reasoned that
to prevail against Ahrens.'
Facility was "attempting to recover for losses ... or injury to property
Because Georgia's statute of repose
caused by deficient construction."
covered Facility's damages claims, the court granted Ahrens's motion for
summary judgment.'
IV.

STATUTES OF LIMITATION

In Jordan Jones & Goulding, Inc. v. Newell Recycling of Atlanta,
Inc.,' Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc. (Newell) was a scrap metal
recycler. Jordan Jones and Goulding, Inc. (JJ&G) was an engineering
firm. JJ&G designed a concrete pad for Newell and completed its
engineering work related to the pad by 1999. In 2004 Newell sued
JJ&G, alleging that the concrete pad was cracking as a result of JJ&G's
design errors." JJ&G moved for summary judgment, asserting that
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25' Newell's claims were barred by the
four-year statute of limitation." Newell responded that its claims were

27. Id. at *3-5.
28. Id. at *6.
29. Id. at *4; see O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51.
30. Facility Onstr. Mgmt., 2010 WL 1265184 at *8.
31. Id.
32. Id. at *10.
33. 299 Ga. App. 294, 682 S.E.2d 666 (2009).
34. Id. at 294-96, 682 S.E.2d at 667-68.
35. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 (2007).
36. See Newell Recycling, 299 Ga. App. at 296, 682 S.E.2d at 668. A four-year
limitations period applies to "aill actions .. . for the breach of any contract not under the
hand of the party sought to be charged, or upon any implied promise or undertaking....
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25.
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governed by the six-year statute of limitation in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24,"
which addresses claims for breach of written contracts.3 The trial
court denied JJ&G's motion, finding there was an issue of fact concerning whether the draft scope and letters between the parties constituted
a written contract and determining that O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 would only
apply to Newell's claims if they were based on a written contract. The
trial court granted JJ&G's certificate of immediate review." Thereafter, the Georgia Court of Appeals granted JJ&G's application for
interlocutory appeal."
The court of appeals reversed the trial court," holding that even if
the letters and draft scope constituted a written contract, Newell's
claims were still subject to the four-year statute of limitation in O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-25.' According to the court, § 9-3-25 applied because Newell
asserted professional malpractice claims that were not based on an
express contract provision that required JJ&G to perform its work in
conformity with professional engineering standards. Rather, Newell
based its claims on an implied contractual obligation for JJ&G to
perform its work."
V. ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS
Settlements of construction claims often involve the assignment of
rights by a defendant to the plaintiff. In Seaboard Construction Co. v.
Weitz Co.," the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Georgia addressed two issues relevant to such assignments. Coastal
Community Retirement Corp. hired the Weitz Company, LLC (Weitz) as
the general contractor to build a retirement project. Weitz subcontracted
with Southeast Land Developers, Inc., which in turn subcontracted with
Seaboard Construction Company to pave some project roads. Seaboard
thereafter filed suit against Southeast and obtained a judgment.
Southeast then assigned to Seaboard its right to payment pursuant to
its contract with Weitz. Seaboard filed this action as an assignee of

37. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 (2007).
38. Newell Recycling, 299 Ga. App. at 298, 682 S.E.2d at 670; see O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24.
39. Newell Recycling, 299 Ga. App. at 297, 682 S.E.2d at 669.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 299-300, 682 S.E.2d at 671.
42. Id. at 297-98, 682 S.E.2d at 669 (quoting Harrison v. Beckham, 238 Ga. App. 199,
200 n.2., 518 S.E.2d 435, 436 n.2 (1999)).
43. Id. at 298-99, 682 S.E.2d at 670.
44. Id. at 299, 682 S.E.2d at 670.
45. No. CV208-105, 2009 WL 3855185 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 2009).
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Southeast asserting Southeast's right to payment under its subcontract
with Weitz."
Weitz filed a motion for summary judgment in which it made two
arguments relating to the assignment of claims. First, Weitz argued
that the assignment of Southeast's rights to Seaboard was unenforceable
because it was only a partial assignment.4 ' The district court acknowledged that, absent the consent of the debtor, partial assignments are
unenforceable because they potentially expose debtors to multiple suits
on the same underlying obligation.4 ' The court also recognized that the
assignment from Southeast to Seaboard limited the amount Seaboard
could collect from Weitz to the amount Southeast owed to Seaboard.4 9
However, because Southeast did not have any rights against Weitz, the
court reasoned that the assignment was full, not partial.o
Second, Weitz argued that the assignment was invalid because Weitz's
subcontract with Southeast forbade assignments without Weitz's
consent." The court rejected that argument on the basis that "under
Georgia law, once a party to a contract performs its obligations under a
contract" so that the contract is no longer executory, that party may
assign its right to payment under the contract "without the other party's
consent," even if the contract contains an anti-assignment clause.52
VI.

DAMAGES LIMITATIONS

In RSN Properties, Inc. v. Engineering Consulting Services, Ltd.,'
RSN Properties, Inc. (RSN), a residential developer, retained Engineering Consulting Services, Ltd. (Engineering Consulting) to perform soil
studies and to advise it on whether it should use septic systems in a
residential subdivision." Engineering Consulting received $2200 for
its work." RSN thereafter sued Engineering Consulting for negligence
and breach of contract, alleging that Engineering Consulting erroneously
determined that most of the lots were suitable for septic systems. RSN
sought damages in excess of $100,000. Engineering Consulting filed a
motion for partial summary judgment, relying on a provision in the

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3,
Id. at *2, *4.
Id. at *5.
301 Ga. App. 52, 686 S.E.2d 853 (2009).
Id.at 52, 686 S.E.2d at 854.
Id.at 54, 686 S.E.2d at 855.
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parties' contract that limited Engineering Consulting's liability to no
more than $50,000 or the value of its services to RSN. RSN responded
by arguing that the damages limitation was void because it violated
public policy. The trial court granted Engineering Consulting's motion,
and RSN appealed.'
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision." In
doing so, the court emphasized that its opinion was based on the
particular facts before it: the parties contracted in a commercial setting
and were in relatively equal bargaining positions; the fee was small
relative to the potential damages resulting from the engineer's alleged
error; and the damages limitation was large enough that the engineer
retained the incentive to properly perform its engineering work.58 The
court also noted that the damages limitation provision did not implicate
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2"5 because it was not a release that held Engineering
Consulting harmless for its engineering errors.60
VII. THE MILLER AcTs
United States for the Use & Benefit of WFI Georgia, Inc. v. Gray
Insurance Co.6' is a federal Miller Act62 case, which involves a convoluted set of facts and parties and no binding precedent from the United

56. Id. at 52-53, 686 S.E.2d at 854.
57. Id. at 55, 686 S.E.2d at 855.
58. Id. at 54, 686 S.E.2d at 855.
59. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (2008). Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b)
[a] covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in or in connection with or
collateral to a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration,
repair, or maintenance of a building structure, appurtenances, and appliances,
including moving, demolition, and excavating connected therewith, purporting to
require that one party to such contract or agreement shall indemnify, hold
harmless, insure, or defend the other party to the contract or other named
indemnitee, including its, his, or her officers, agents, or employees, against
liability or claims for damages, losses, or expenses, including attorney fees, arising
out of bodily injury to persons, death, or damage to property caused by or
resulting from the sole negligence of the indemnitee, or its, his, or her officers,
agents, or employees, is against public policy and void and unenforceable. This
subsection shall not affect any obligation under workers' compensation or coverage
or insurance specifically relating to workers' compensation, nor shall this
subsection apply to any requirement that one party to the contract purchase a
project specific insurance policy, including an owner's or contractor's protective
insurance, builder's risk insurance, installation coverage, project management
protective liability insurance, an owner controlled insurance policy, or a contractor
controlled insurance policy.
60. RSN Properties,301 Ga. App. at 54-55, 686 S.E.2d at 855.
61. 701 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
62. 40 U.S.C. §0 3131-3134 (2006).
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States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit." In Gray Insurance,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
held that the surety was bound by the arbitration award against its
principal because the surety, which did not participate in the arbitration,
had both notice of the arbitration and an opportunity to defend its
principal."
In Western Surety Co. v. APAC-Southeast, Inc.,' APAC-Southeast,
Inc. (APAC) subcontracted with Bruce Albea Contracting, Inc. (Albea) to
provide asphalt for a Georgia Department of Transportation road project.
The subcontract prohibited APAC from assigning it. APAC provided
asphalt for part of the project and then assigned the subcontract to C.W.
Matthews Contracting Company, Inc. (C.W. Matthews) as part of an
assignment and sale of most of APAC's assets to C.W. Matthews. At the
time of the assignment, Albea owed APAC $1,202,745.98. After the
assignment, APAC filed suit against Albea for breach of contract and
against Albea's surety, Western Surety Company and Continental
Casualty Company (collectively "Western Surety"), for payment under a
payment bond. The trial court granted APAC's motion for summary
judgment against Albea and Western Surety, and the defendants
appealed."6
The defendants argued that the trial court erred when it granted
summary judgment to APAC because APAC's breach of the antiassignment provision of its subcontract negated its claim against both
Albea and its sureties.' The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with the
defendants that APAC could not pursue a breach of contract claim given
that APAC assigned the subcontract in violation of the anti-assignment
provision.68 However, the court held that APAC could recover on the
payment bond despite the anti-assignment provision.69 In reaching
that conclusion, the court noted that Georgia's Little Miller Act7 o
creates a cause of action for claims under public works contracts, and the
statute should be liberally construed.' The court also noted that the
subject payment bond was "unambiguous as to the sureties' responsibili-

63. See Gruy Insurance, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 1323, 1327.
64. Id. at 1326, 1328-29.
65. 302 Ga. App. 654, 691 S.E.2d 234 (2010).
66. Id. at 654-55, 691 S.E.2d at 236-37.
67. Id. at 654, 691 S.E.2d at 236.
68. Id. at 655-57, 691 S.E.2d at 237-38.
69. Id. at 657, 691 S.E.2d at 238.
70. Ga. H.R. Bill 513, Reg. Sess., 2001 Ga. Laws 820 (codified in scattered sections of
the O.C.G.A.).
71. Western Surety, 302 Ga. App. at 657-58, 691 S.E.2d at 238; see O.C.GA. § 13-10-63
(2010).
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ty for paying anyone providing labor or materials to the project.""
Finally, the court noted that Western Surety consented to delegating
APAC's duties to C.W. Matthews, the assignee, under the subcontract
when Western Surety negotiated a new contract with C.W. Matthews
and payed it substantial sums for providing asphalt." For these
reasons, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment against Western Surety and Albea (as principal under the
payment bond) on APAC's bond claim."
VIII.

WARRANTIES

In GeorgiaState Financing& Investment Commission v. XL Specialty
Insurance Co., Georgia State Financing & Investment Commission
(GSFIC) entered into a contract with a general contractor for the
construction of buildings for a state hospital. After a final inspection
required by the contract, the general contractor had XL Specialty
Insurance Company (XL) issue a roof bond in favor of GSFIC." The
bond warranted that the roof would be watertight "for a period of five
years from the date of the execution of the final certificate of the
architect."" The architect, however, expressly refused to issue a final
certificate of completion because the work had not been completed. Four
years after the bond was issued, GSFIC sued XL and others on the bond,
alleging roof leaks. The trial court granted summary judgment to XL,
and GSFIC appealed." The issue on appeal was whether the bond
applied because the architect had never executed the final certificate.7 9
The Georgia Court of Appeals reasoned that the bond clearly covered
only roof and wall issues within five years after the architect executed
the final certificate, and because the certificate was never executed, the
bond was not triggered.' Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of XL.8 '

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Western Surety, 302 Ga. App. at 658, 691 S.E.2d at 239 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 658-59, 691 S.E.2d at 239.
303 Ga. App. 540, 694 S.E.2d 193 (2010).
Id. at 540-41, 694 S.E.2d at 194.
Id. at 541, 694 S.E.2d at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 542-43, 694 S.E.2d at 195-96.
Id. at 543, 694 S.E.2d at 196.
Id.
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ARBITRATION

A. InternationalFidelity Insurance Co. v. BMC Contractors,Inc.
In InternationalFidelity Insurance Co. v. BMC Contractors,Inc.," a
federal court action, International Fidelity Insurance Co. (IFIC) sued a
number of defendants, including Star Building Systems (Star) and BMC
Contractors, Inc. (BMC) for negligence and breach of contract. Star filed
a cross-claim against BMC. When BMC failed to timely answer the
claim, Star obtained a default judgment against BMC. Almost two
weeks later, BMC filed a response to the cross-claim along with a motion
to set aside the default judgment."
About five months later, while that motion was still pending, BMC
moved the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia to stay the suit and to compel arbitration under an arbitration
provision in the contract between Star and BMC." Finding good cause
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55,m the court set aside the
default.' In doing so, the court characterized the good cause standard
In a second blow to Star, the court then determined
as "mutable."
that BMC had not waived its right to demand and compel arbitration,
even though BMC waited five months after filing its motion to set aside
Star's default judgment before filing its motion to compel arbitration."

B. LandSouth Construction,LLC v. Lake Shadow Ltd.
In LandSouth Construction, LLC v. Lake Shadow Ltd.,' Lake
Shadow Limited, LLC (Lake Shadow) hired LandSouth Construction,
LLC (LandSouth) to build a condominium project. After the project was
completed, a dispute arose about the amount of money Lake Shadow
owed to LandSouth. LandSouth filed a mechanic's lien on the project
and followed with a suit against Lake Shadow to perfect and foreclose
on the lien. LandSouth asserted breach of contract, quantum meruit,
and unjust enrichment but did not invoke the arbitration provision in

82. No. 5:06-ev-186 (CAR), 2009 WL 2143820 (M.D. Ga. July 14, 2009).
83. Id. at *1-2.
84. Id. at *2.
85. FED. R. CIv. P. 55.
86. Int'L Fid. Ins., 2009 WL 2143820, at *2.
87. Id. (quoting Compania Interamericana Export-Import, SA v. Compania
Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
88. Id. at *3.
89. 303 Ga. App. 413, 693 S.E.2d 608 (2010).
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the parties' contract. Before Lake Shadow responded and before the
parties engaged in significant discovery, the parties settled that suit, and
LandSouth filed a dismissal."
Seven months later, Lake Shadow filed a damages suit against
LandSouth for negligent construction and breaches of contract and
warranty. LandSouth responded and moved to compel arbitration. The
trial court denied the motion to compel, finding that LandSouth had
waived its right to insist on arbitration when it did not raise the
arbitration provision in the prior litigation. Significantly, the trial court
stated that had LandSouth's complaint in the prior suit only sought to
perfect and foreclose on its liens instead of also including claims for
damages, no waiver would have occurred because the law required
LandSouth to perfect and foreclose its lien in court rather than allow it
to pursue those remedies in arbitration." The trial court issued a
certificate of immediate review, and the Georgia Court of Appeals
granted LandSouth's application for interlocutory appeal."
In its opinion, the court of appeals first noted that the Georgia
Supreme Court issued a policy statement in Phillips Construction Co. v.
Cowart Iron Works, Inc." in favor of granting interlocutory appeals of
a trial judge's decision to stay judicial proceedings pending arbitration.'
Reversing the trial court, the court of appeals held that
LandSouth had not waived its right to arbitrate by filing the first action
because it was required to file that action to perfect and foreclose on its
lien." The court also determined that Lake Shadow had not shown
prejudice from the filing of the first action because that action had
quickly settled." Finally, the court cited a general non-waiver provision in the parties' contract that incorporated general conditions set
forth by the American Institute of Architects. 7
X.

RIGHT TO TERMINATE CONTRACTS

In Forsyth County v. Waterscape Services, LLC," Forsyth County,
Georgia (Forsyth), and Waterscape Services, LLC (Waterscape) entered
90. Id. at 413-14, 693 S.E.2d at 608-09. The terms of the settlement are not included
in the opinion. See LandSouth Constr., 303 Ga. App. 413, 693 S.E.2d 608.
91. Id at 414, 693 S.E.2d at 609.
92. Id.
93. 250 Ga. 488, 299 S.E.2d 538 (1983).
94. LandSouth Constr., 303 Ga. App. at 414 n.2, 693 S.E.2d at 609 n.2 (quoting Phillips
Constr., 250 Ga. at 489, 299 S.E.2d at 539).
95. Id. at 415-16, 693 S.E.2d at 610.
96. Id. at 415, 693 S.E.2d at 610.
97. Id. at 415-16, 693 S.E.2d at 610.

98. 303 Ga. App. 623, 694 S.E.2d 102 (2010).

2010]

CONSTRUCTION LAW

83

into a contract for Waterscape to design and construct a water treatment
plant and then convey it to Forsyth." After the project was complete,
Waterscape notified Forsyth that it was terminating the contract
because of a change order dispute between the parties and that it would
not convey the plant to Forsyth.'o Forsyth sued for specific performance and damages for breach of contract. Waterscape counterclaimed
for a declaratory judgment that it had properly terminated the contract
and for other relief. The trial court denied Forsyth's motion for
summary judgment but granted summary judgment on Waterscape's
counterclaims.0 o
On appeal, one key issue was whether Waterscape had waived its
right to terminate the contract. 02 The court of appeals held that
Waterscape waived its right to terminate under a specific provision of
the contract because that provision only applied prior to commencing the
project.1 " The court stated that because Waterscape had proceeded
with the project, it waived termination rights under that provision."o
The other key issue on appeal was whether Forsyth's alleged failure
to pay for the change order allowed Waterscape to terminate the
contract.1"5 The court stated that for a party to have the right to
terminate a contract rather than merely seek damages for a breach, the
breach must be material, which the court defined as "so substantial and
Because the
fundamental as to defeat the object of the contract."'
change order dispute involved only about two percent of the total
compensation to Waterscape under the contract and the dispute did not
prevent Waterscape from completing the project, the court reasoned that
the alleged breach was not material and Waterscape could not terminate
Thus, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
the contract.'
denial of Forsyth's motion for summary judgment and its grant of
summary judgment to Waterscape.'"

99. Id. at 623-24, 694 S.E.2d at 105-06.
100. Id. at 623, 694 S.E.2d at 105.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 629, 694 S.E.2d at 109.
103. Id. at 630-31, 694 S.E.2d at 109-10.
104. Id. at 632, 694 S.E.2d at 111.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 633, 694 S.E.2d at 111 (quoting Lanier Home Ctr., Inc. v. Underwood, 252
Ga. App. 745, 746, 557 S.E.2d 76, 79 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 633-34, 694 S.E.2d at 112.
108. Id. at 634, 694 S.E.2d at 112.
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EcONOMIC Loss RULE

Although not a construction case, ASC ConstructionEquipment USA,

Inc. v. City Commercial Real Estate, Inc." provides a reminder of an
exception to the economic loss rule,"o frequently invoked in the context
of construction disputes." In ASC Construction, the court of appeals
reiterated that under the economic loss rule, a contracting party
generally must seek a remedy in contract-not in tort-when the party
suffers purely economic losses."2 According to the court, however, an
exception applies in certain cases of fraudulent misrepresentation.'
XII. ACCEPrANCE DOCTRINE
In Hollis & Spann, Inc. v. Hopkins,"' the plaintiff sued Hollis &
Spann, Inc. (Hollis), the contractor of a hotel handicap access ramp, for
damages she suffered while trying to cross the ramp. Hollis filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing that the acceptance doctrine
The trial court denied Hollis's
precluded the plaintiff's claims."
motion.n Thereafter, the Georgia Court of Appeals granted Hollis's
application for interlocutory appeal."'
The court described the acceptance doctrine as follows:
[Wlhere a contractor who does not hold itself out as an expert in the
design work such as that involved in the controversy, performs its work
without negligence, and the work is approved and accepted by the
owner or the one who contracted for the work on the owner's behalf,
the contractor is not liable for injuries resulting from the defective
design of the work."s
Recognizing that several exceptions to the acceptance doctrine exist,
however, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of

109. 303 Ga. App. 309, 693 S.E.2d 559 (2010).
110. See id. at 316, 693 S.E.2d at 566.
111. See, e.g., J. Kinson Cook, Inc. v. Heery/Mitchell, 284 Ga. App. 552,644 S.E.2d 440
(2007); Rowe v. Akin & Flanders, Inc., 240 Ga. App. 766, 525 S.E.2d 123 (1999).
112. ASC Constr., 303 Ga. App. at 316, 693 S.E.2d at 566 (quoting City of Cairo v.
Hightower Consulting Eng'rs, 278 Ga. App. 721, 728, 629 S.E.2d 518, 524-25 (2006)).
113. Id.
114. 301 Ga. App. 29, 686 S.E.2d 817 (2009).
115. Id. at 29, 686 S.E.2d at 818.
116. Id. at 30, 686 S.E.2d at 818.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 31, 686 S.E.2d at 819 (quoting Bragg v. Oxford Constr. Co., 285 Ga. 98, 99
n.1, 674 S.E.2d 268, 269 n.1 (2009)).
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summary judgment for two reasons.'" First, there was an issue of fact
as to whether Hollis had negligently constructed the ramp.'20 That
issue existed even though the hotel and the municipal inspector had
allegedly accepted the ramp because there was evidence that the ramp
did not comply with the plans and applicable codes.' 1 Because of this
issue of fact, the acceptance doctrine did not clearly apply.12
Second, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Hollis's
motion for summary judgment because there was an issue of fact about
whether the ramp was imminently dangerous.'" If it was, then the
exception to the acceptance doctrine for imminently dangerous work
would apply.'

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 32-33, 686 S.E.2d at 819-20.
Id. at 32, 686 S.E.2d at 820.
Id. at 30, 32, 686 S.E.2d at 818, 820.
Id. at 33, 686 S.E.2d at 820.
Id.
See id. at 32, 686 S.E.2d at 819.

